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Abstract
Mechanism design uses the tools of economics and game theory to design rules
of interaction for economic transactions that will,in principle, yield some de-
sired outcome. In the last few years this field has received much interest of
researchers in computer science, especially with the Internet developing as a
platform for communications and connections among enormous numbers of
computers and humans. Arguably the most positive result in mechanism de-
sign is truthful and there are only one general truthful mechanisms so far :
the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. But VCG mecha-
nism has one shortage:”the implementation of truthfulness is on the cost of
decreasing the revenue of the mechanism.” (e.g., Ning Chen and Hong Zhu.
[1999]). We introduce three new characters of mechanism:partly truthful, criti-
cal , consistent, and introduce a new mechanism: X mechanism that satisfy the
above three characters. Like VCG mechanism, X mechanism also generalizes
from Vickery Auction and is consistent with Vickery auction in many ways,
but the extended methods used in X mechanism is different from that in VCG
mechanism . This paper will demonstrate that X mechanism better than VCG
mechanism in optimizing utility of mechanism , which is the original intention
of mechanism design. So partly truthful,critical and consistent are at least as
important as truthful in mechanism design, and they beyond truthful in many
situations.As a result , we conclude that partly truthful,critical and consistent
are three new directions in mechanism design.
1. Introduction
Mechanism design uses the tools of economics and game theory to design ”rules of interaction”
for economic transactions that will, in principle, yield some desired outcome. In the last few
years this field has received much interest of researchers in computer science, especially with the
Internet developing as a platform for communications and connections among enormous numbers of
computers and humans. Arguably the most positive result in mechanism design is truthful and only
one general truthful mechanisms : the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. But
VCG mechanism has one shortage:”the implementation of truthfulness is on the cost of decreasing
the revenue of the mechanism.” (e.g., Ning Chen and Hong Zhu. [1999]). We introduce three new
characters of mechanism: partly truthful, critical and consistent, and introduce a new mechanism:
X mechanism that satisfy the above three characters. Like VCG mechanism, X mechanism also
generalizes from Vickery Auction and is consistent with Vickery auction in many ways, but the
extended methods of X mechanism and VCG mechanism is different. This paper will demonstrate
that X mechanism better than VCG mechanism in optimizing utility of mechanism , which is the
original intention of utility of mechanism. So partly truthful , critical and consistent are at least
as important as truthful in mechanism design, and they beyond truthful in many situations.As a
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result , we think partly truthful ,critical and consistent are are three New directions in mechanism
design.
Mechanism design, a classic economic concept [Osborne et al. 1994], [ Papadimitriou, C.H.
2001], deals with algorithmic design problems involving in such human factors, as in task allocation
problems (see Feigebaum, J. et al. [2000] and Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. [1999] and W.E.
Walsh et al. [1998], for example), communication networks (see Joan Feigenbaum et al. [2000]
and Elias Koutsoupias et al. [1999], for example), multi-agent systems [Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
and Gilad Zlotkin 1994], shortest paths problems [Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen 1998] and so on.
Intuitively, mechanism design can be described as the design of protocols that realize a given target
(objective function) under the assumption that the participants (agents) are all self-interested and
rational ones who aim to optimize their own goals (ref Ning Chen and Hong Zhu [2004]). The
main motivation of this field is micro-economic and the tools are game-theoretic.
The major achievement of mechanism design theory is VCG mechanism by Vickrey [1961],
Clarke [1971], and Groves [1973] . It is the only one general truthful(also called incentive com-
patible, which means that the agents’ interests are best served by behaving truthfully) technique
known so far. It essentially provides a solution for any utilitarian problem (except for the possible
problem that there might be dominant strategies other than truth-telling). It generalizes from
Vickery Auction (named after Vickrey, who is widely recognized as the founder of auction theory
and received the Economics Nobel Memorial prize in 1996.,which can motivate competing suppliers
to reveal their true prices. It has been discussed, e.g., in article written by Green, J., Laffont, J.J.
[1997], extensively. Nisan and Ronen [10, 19] studied this problem from the view of algorithmic
design.
But when VCG mechanism is applied to complex mechanism design problems such as combina-
torial auctions [Nisan, N 2000], shortest paths problems by Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen [1999],
one shortcoming emerge: It excessively considers every agent’s utility and ignores the mechanism’s
profit, to some extent, its total cost will be more larger than the traditional First Price Auction’s
in some case even if every agent raises their bidden (we will give an example in section 3).
To solve the shortcoming mentioned above, we introduce three new characters of mechanism:
partly truthful, critical and consistent, and introduce a new mechanism: X mechanism that satisfy
the above three characters. In fact, both X mechanism and VCG mechanism extend the Vickrey
auction, but their extension methods are different. Later we will demonstrate that partly truthful,
critical and consistent are three new directions in mechanism design, which are at least as important
as truthful and can beyond truthful in many aspects.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we propose a formal model that assumes the participants all act according to their
own self-interest. We adopt a rationality-based approach, using notions from game theory and
micro-economics and particularly from the field of mechanism design. We assume that each par-
ticipant has a well-defined utility function that represents its preference over the possible outputs
of the algorithm, and we assume that participants rationally act to optimize their utility. We also
assume that participants are independent. We term such rational and selfish participants agents.
The solutions we consider contain both an algorithmic ingredient (obtaining the intended results)
and a payment ingredient that motivates the agents. We term such a solution mechanism(references
Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen [1999]).
Intuitively, a mechanism design problem has two components: the usual algorithmic output
specification and descriptions of what the participating agents want, formally given as utility
functions over the set of possible outputs.
Definition 2.1. A mechanism design problem is given by an output specification and by a set
of agents’ utilities. Specifically:
(1) There are n agents, each agent i has available to it some private input ti ∈ T i(termed its type).
Anything else in this scenario is public knowledge.
(2) The output specification maps to each type vector t = (t1, ...tn) a set of allowed outputs o ∈ O,
where O is a finite set of outcomes.
(3) Each agent i’s preferences are given by a real valued function: vi(ti, o), called its valuation.
This is a quantification of its value from the output o, when its type is ti, in terms of some common
currency, i.e., if the mechanism’s output is o and in addition the mechanism hands this agent pi
2
units of this currency, then its utility will be ui = pi + vi(ti, o).This utility is what the agent aims
to optimize. (ref Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen [1999])
Remark 2.1. In some sense, we can approximately take ti as agent i’s cost price, and take o
as a outcome to state which agent is selected, vi(ti, o) is the price agent i bids, pi stands for the
payment mechanism give to agent i and take ui as the agent i’s profit.
Definition 2.2. A (direct revelation) mechanism is a pair m = (o, p) such that:
(1) The output function o accepts as input a vector V = (v1, ..., vn) of declared valuation functions
and returns an output o(V ) ∈ O(where O is a finite set of outcomes).
(2) The payment function p(V ) = (p1(V ), ..., pn(V )) returns a real vector. This is the payment
handed by the mechanism to each of the agents (e.g. if pi = −2 then the agent pays two units of
currency to the mechanism). (ref Ning Chen and Hong Zhu [2004])
Remark 2.2. In the above definition, the declaration vi of agent i is not necessarily equal to ti,
since he may not tell the truth to the mechanism. His outcome is determined in terms of how to
maximize his utility value ui = pi + vi(ti, o) where o is the outcome of the mechanism
Remark 2.3 We may define various outcome functions in different models. In utilitarian prob-
lems, the outcome function of the mechanism is to select an optimal outcome o ∈ O that maximizes
the objective function g(o, v) = vi(ti, o), which is termed as social utility.
Notation 2.1: (a1, ...ai−1, ai+1...an) is denoted by a−i. (ai, a−i) will denote the tuple (a1, ...an).
Remark 2.4. In a direct revelation mechanism, the participants are simply asked to reveal their
types to the mechanism. Based on these declarations the mechanism then computes the output
o and the payment pi for each of the agents. As they may lie to the mechanism, it should be
carefully designed such that it will be for the benefit of each agent to reveal her true type to the
mechanism.
Definition 2.3 A mechanism is called truthful if truth-telling is a dominant outcome. I.e. for
every agent i of type ti and for every type declaration t−i for the other agents, the agent’s utility
is maximized when she declares her real valuation function ti. (Ref Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen
[2000])
Remark 2.5. One desirable property of mechanisms is that the utility of a truthful agent is
always non-negative. This is often called participation constraints (ref Nisan, N’s [1999]).
Remark2.6. A outcome is dominant if, regardless of what any other players do, the outcome
earns a player a larger payoff than any other .In truthful-telling mechanism, Truth-telling is a
dominant outcome.
Next we will talk about Vickrey Auction and analyze its properties. The well-known Vickrey
Auction is a sealed-bid second price auction in which each participant simultaneously submits bids.
The auctioneer discloses the identity of the highest agent who is declared as the winner. The price
paid, however, is equal to the second-highest bidding. This format is named after William Vickrey
who first described it and pointed out that agents have a dominant outcome to bid their true
values.
The Vickrey Auction have three significant characters:
(1)Truthful.
(2)Critical: There will be two possible choice if the mechanism pays a little more. If mechanism
increase its utility a little, there are only one possible outcome;In other words, the auctioneer
needn’t pay more money than second-highest price,otherwise he can choose agent who bids the
second-highest price.
(3)Consistent: The outcome of mechanism can maximize the profit of both mechanism and that
of auctioneers at the same time.
Definition 2.4. A mechanism m = (o, p) belongs to VCG family if:
(1) o(w) ∈ arg max o∈O
n∑
i=1
vi(ti, o).
(2) The payment is calculated according to the VCG formula pi(V ) = vj(o(V )) + hi(V −i),where
hi is an arbitrary function of V −i.
THEOREM 1 ([3]) A VCG mechanism is truthful.
Note that because of truthfulness, every agent indeed reports his true type ti in VCG mecha-
nism, i.e., vi = ti.
Many algorithmic mechanism design problems can be solved using the VCG mechanism, for
example task allocation problems([Feigebaum, J. et al. 2000]) and combinatorial auctions studied
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by Nisan, N. [2000]. In this paper, we will discuss mechanism design mainly about the Shortest
Path Problem .
The description of Shortest Path Problem is as follows: We are given a directed graph G with
two distinguished nodes s and t. Each edge e in the graph is owned by a self interested agent i,
and I(e) denotes the set of edges belonging to agent i. The actual cost of routing an object along
an edge e (denoted by ve) is privately known to its owner. The goal of the center is to acquire an
path from s to t and pay as little money as possible. This goal is not shared by the participating
agents. Each agent selfishly wants to maximize her own profit which is the difference between her
payment pi and her actual costs, that is, ui = pi−
∑
e∈P∩I(e) ve, where P denotes the chosen path.
We assume that no agent owns a cut in the graph.
When all agents honestly report their costs in VCG mechanism, the cheapest path is chosen:
the output is obtained by a simple shortest path calculation. The payment given to agent i is 0 if
i is not in the shortest path and pi = (di=∞− di=0) if it is , here di=∞ is the length of the shortest
path which does not contain i , and di=0 is the length of the shortest path when the cost of i is
assumed to be zero. Notice that the shortest path is indeed a minimization of the total cost.
In the Figure 1, Suppose sender X is looking for a path to Y for transmiting something.
There are several paths from X to the Y. Each edge on the path stands for an selfish agent.
The number beside every agent stands for its cost vi. We can find the cheapest path is X →
A → B → C → D → E → F → Y . According to VCG mechanism: pA = dA=∞ − dA=0 =
(vJ + vP + vE + vF )− (vB + vC + vD + vE + vF ) = (4 + 4 + 1 + 1)
Example 1:
Figure1
−(1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1) = 5
pB = dB=∞ − dB=0 = (vA + vG + vK + vD + vE + vF )− (vA + vC + vD + vE + vF ) = (1+ 1+ 2+
1 + 1 + 1)− (1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1) = 1
pC = dC=∞ − dC=0 = 1 , p
D = dD=∞ − dD=0 = 5 , P
E = 10 , PF = 11
The total cost of sending a single message along this cheapest path is pA + pB + pC + pD +
pE + pF = 33, which is twice more than the most expensive path (vN + vO = 16).
We analyze disadvantages of the VCG mechanism by example 1:
(1) For making up of the cheapest path, edge B is as important as edge C, because without either
of them the cheapest path will change to X → A → G → K → D → E → F → Y . They should
share the payment of contributions to make up the cheapest path. But in the VCG mechanism, the
payment of each edge is pi = di=∞ − di=0. It gives the total payment to every edge and assuming
other edge’s profit is 0.This will makes the sum of payment be large.
(2) It can be observed that edge B and edge C make different contributions from edge A. The
shortest path when delete the edge B or C is Because of the (1)(2)above, they should belong to
different groups and share the payment of their corresponding groups. Edge B and edge C should
belong to the same group, edge A should belongs to another group.
We have analyzed the Vickrey auction has a significant merit: Critical. But by Example 1, we
can see that the VCG mechanism has not this significant merit. With the payment 33 currency
settled by VCG mechanism , all the agents whose profit above zero will accept the payment, so the
mechanism can choose any path which the total bidden less than 33. There are six pathes from X
to Y can be selected by sender X:
X → A → B → C → D → E → F → Y , X → A → G → K → D → E → F → Y , X → A →
H → I → D → E → F → Y , X → J → P → E → F → Y , X → A → M → L → F → Y ,
X → N → O → Y .
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We can also observe that in the above example, if edge A raises his price, the total cost of
mechanism will go down in the VCG mechanism. It shows that the payment by VCG mechanism
is not the optimal for the auctioneer. In above example , If the bidding of A is rise to 4 ,then the
payment of X by VCG will be computed as follows:
The cheapest path from x to y is X → A → B → C → D → E → F → Y . pA =
dA=∞−dA=0 = (vJ+vP+vE+vF )−(vB+vC+vD+vE+vF ) = (4+4+1+1)−(1+1+1+1+1) = 5,
pB = 1 , pC = 1 , pD = 2 , PE = 10 , PF 7 ,The total cost of sending a single message along this
cheapest path is pA + pB + pC + pD + pE + pF = 26. So , A bid 4 is more favorable than A bid 1
for the sender x .
Remark 2.7. In VCG Mechanism, the truth-telling outcome is more profitable for agent than
for the mechanism. The implementation of truthfulness is on the cost of decreasing the revenue of
the mechanism. Thus we should find a weaker feasible notion of truthfulness and new mechanisms
to balance the profits of Mechanism and agent
3. A new mechanism: X mechanism
For simplicity, we discuss X mechanism mainly about the shortest path problems in this section.
Notation 3.1: In following , o1 denote the best outcome in O, o2 stands for the second best
outcome . . . os stands for the s-th best outcome.
Notation 3.2: The cost of each outcome is denoted by sj =
∑
i∈oj
vi
Definition 3.1 If agent i is in o1, o2, . . . and until oq simultaneously, but not in o(q+1) , then
agent i belongs to the q-th group , denoted by ki = q or i ∈ gq.
For example, in the Shortest Path problem , for every agent i , the agent’s ki = s when
agent I’s vi is in the cheapest path, in the second cheapest path , . . . in the s’th cheapest path os
simultaneously and not in (s+1)th cheapest path os+1.
Remark 3.1 In the Definition 3.1 we only classify the agents in o1 to groups and other agents
are not classified to groups.
Definition 3.2 (X mechanism)
A mechanism m = (o, p) belongs to X mechanism if:
(1) o(w) ∈ arg maxo∈O
n∑
i=1
vi(ti, o)
according to the Notation 3.1, it is o1.
(2)According to the Definition 3.1, Agents in the outcome of o(w) are divided into some groups
: (g1, g2, . . . , gh).(suppose there are h groups in the shortest path)
(3) The total profit of all agents in group gi is denoted by Qgi , it can be computed as follows:
Qgi = s((gi)+1) - s(g(i−1)+1)
(4)The pure profit of agent j ∈ gi is calculated according to the formula H(vj , V (gi)
, Qgi), where V
(gi) denote all bidding of agents which is in group gi , H is an arbitrary function
and H > 0. The payment to agent j is pj = vj +H(vj , V (gi), Qgi) > v
i.
Remark3.2: Here the total pure profit of group i stands for the difference between the total
payment and the total bid of agents in group i.
Remark3.3: Suppose agent j∈ gi and the number of agents in group gi is m(m ≥ 1). There are
many possible formula for H, some of them be listed as follows:
3.2.1 H(vj , V (gi), Qgi) = Qgi/m
3.2.2 Each agent in group i gets his profit according to the reverse sequence of his input in all
bidding of agents which is in group gi. Suppose the bid of agent w is the j-th big in group i and
the bid of agent y is (m-j+1)-th big in group i, The formula is:
Pw = vw + (vy/(
∑
k∈gi
vk))×Qgi
For example,there are three agents a,b,c(i.e. m=3) in group gi, and v
a = 10, vb = 20, vc = 30,
then P a = (10 + (30/(10 + 20 + 30)) × Qgi), P
b = (20 + (20/(10 + 20 + 30)) ∗ Qgi), P
c =
(30 + (10/(10 + 20 + 30))×Qgi).
3.2.3 The mechanism firstly distributes a minimum of profit ∆ to every agent of group z, then
distributes the rest of profits to the agent i(suppose the bidding of agent i is lowest in group z)
until equal to the bidding of agent j (suppose the bidding of agent j is second lowest in group
z), and then distribute the rest of profits to agent i and agent j until their payment equal the
the bidding of k(suppose the bidding of agent k is third lowest in group z). . . . . . Repeated above
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distributing process until the payment of all agents are the same or the profits are all distributed.
The exact computation is as follows
1. compute j which satisfies the following formula(△ stands for the minimum profit , and
suppose the smallest bid in gi which is bigger than vj is vj+1)
m×△+ vj × j +
∑
k∈gz and vk>vj
vk <= Q+
∑
k∈gz
vk < m×△+ vj+1 × (j +1)+
∑
k∈gz and vk>vj+1
vk
2. P k = (Q−m×△+ vj × j +
∑
k∈gz and vk>vj
vk)/j + vj (k ∈ gz and vk <= vj)
P k = vk +∆ (k ∈ gz and vk > vj)
For example, there are three agents a,b,c in group si(i.e. m=3), and v
a = 10, vb = 20,
vc = 30, ∆ = 1, Qsi = 15,then the process of distribute the payment of group Vj can be denote by
(va, vb, vc) = (10, 20, 30)→ (11, 21, 31)→ (21, 21, 31)→ (22, 22, 31) = (pa, pb, pc).
Remark3.4: The function H in Remark 3.2.1 and the function H in Remark 3.2.2 represent two
extreme distributing strategies and The function H in Remark 3.2.3 combines them. The character
of function H in Remark 3.2.1 is distributing the payment as averagely as possible. The character
of function H In Remark 3.2.2 is letting the following condition as possible as be satisfied: The
lower the bidding of agent is, the higher its pure profit is. Thus H in Remark 3.2.2 and in Remark
3.2.3 is better than H in Remark 3.2.1 in encouraging bidders report their type.
In addition, we also can use the compounding-form of the three above. For example, firstly
we use the third method, then the spare profits are distributed by the first or second method.
The objective of various forms for function H is to make every agent tell his valuation truthfully,
(because H can make the agent whose valuation is lower get more pure profit.) to make the Critical
mechanism is truthful. But it is a pity that no matter which form is chosen, for individual agent,
it is not truthful. It is just close to truthful. We will use combinatorial mechanism to solve this
problem later .
Remark3.5: In X mechanism, we consider the agents of group s as a single entity, and all agents
in this group share the pure profit of the group Qs. We denote the total pure profit of group s by
Qs, and all agents in this group share Qs according to function H in Remark 3.3
Now we apply X mechanism to the Example 1 (according to figure 1)as follows:
the shortest path o1 is:
X → A→ B → C → D → E → F → Y , s1 = 6 , the second shortest path o2 is : X → A→ G→
K → D → E → F → Y , s2 = 7 , the third shortest path o3 is : X → A → H → I → D → E →
F → Y , s3 = 9 , the fourth shortest path o4 is : X → J → P → E → F → Y , s4 = 10 , the
fifth shortest path o5 is : X → A → M → L → F → Y , s5 = 15 , the sixth shortest path o6 is:
X → N → O → Y . s6 = 15
In figure 1 , 1-group contain edge B and C (denoted by g1={B,C}, for they belong to o(1) and
not belong to o(2) ; edge A and D belong to the 2-group, for they belong to o(1) ,o(2) , o(3) ,and
not belong to o(4) ; edge E belongs to the 4-group; edge F belongs to the 5-group.
The profit of 1-group is Q1 = s2−s1 = 7−6 = 1 , The profit of 2-group is Q2 = s4−s2 = 10−7 = 3
, The profit of 3-group is Q3 = s5−s4 = 15−10 = 5 , The profit of 4-group is Q4 = Q4 = s6−s5 =
16− 15 = 1 ,
If the function H in 3.2.1 is adopted , then PB = vB+H(Q1) = 1+0.5 = 1.5 , P
C = vC+H(Q1) =
1 + 0.5 = 1.5 , PA = vA + H(Q3) = 1 + 1.5 = 2.5 , P
D = vD + H(Q3) = 1 + 1.5 = 2.5 ,
PE = vE +H(Q4) = 1 + 5 = 6 , P
F = vF +H(Q5) = 1 + 1 = 2 .
Remark3.6 Q(i) = Q(gi) be equal to(s((gi)+1) - s(g(i−1)+1)) and need not be equal to ((s(i+1)) -
(si)), For example in figure 1 ,g1 = 1, g2 = 3, Q2 = (sgi+1 − sg(i−1)+1) = (s4 − s2) 6= (s4 − s3) .
Remark3.7 X mechanism and VCG mechanism both extend the Vickrey auction. But their
extend manner is different. VCG extends Vickery auction by ways of considering agent’s profit
and preserves truthful characteristic; X mechanism extends Vickery auction by ways of considering
mechanism’s profit and remains the critical characteristic.
Remark3.8 In X mechanism, the total payment is
C = sv1 +
∑
Qvi = sv1 + (sv2 − sv1) + (sv3 − sv2) + . . . (svh − sv(h−1)) + (sv(h+1) − svh) = sv(h+1) .
(Suppose vh is the index number of maximum group in the cheapest path)
Remark 3.9 When there is only one member in a group the member will choose the bidden
the same as he is under truthful mechanism. Because raising price will increase risk and will not
increase profit.
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4. Three new characters of mechanism
In this section , we will discuss three new characters of mechanism : (strongly)partly truthful
, (Strongly) Critical ,(Strongly ,Partially ,Impossible)Consistent .
Definition 4.1 Any mechanism which satisfies the following three conditions is called partly
truthful mechanism.
(1)When agent bid his type , its probability of being selected is the highest.
(2)The higher the agent’s bidding is, the lower the probability of his being selected is.
(3)The utility of the agent is more than zero when he is selected.
Remark 4.1 The difference between partly truthful mechanisms and truthful mechanisms is
that in truthful mechanism the highest probability of agent being selected and the highest utility
of agent will attain at the same time when agent bids his type. But in partly truthful mechanism,
when the agent bids his type, only his probability of being selected is the highest. So truthful
mechanisms are the subsets of partly truthful mechanisms.
Remark 4.2 The risk-avert agent or rational agent will choose to bid true price in partly truthful
mechanisms.
Definition 4.2: A mechanism is called strongly partly truthful mechanism , if agent i raise his
bidden in a certain range, the payment to it will be unchanged, but the probility of its not been
seclected will be enlarged at the same time ; if it raise his bidden above this certain range , then
the payment to it will be enlarged under the condition that it is also be selected all the same , and
the probility of its not been seclected will be enlarged at the same time.
THEOREM 4.1 X mechanism is truthful to the all agents selected by the mechanism. The
total payment of X mechanism is C = sv(h+1)(the meaning of h is the same as that in Conclusion
4.1). It is not related to the biddings of agents which are in cheapest path. So it is truthful. If
there is only one edge on the Shortest Path, X mechanism degenerate to Vickrey auction.
THEOREM 4.2 X mechanism is partly truthful .
Prove: pi = vi+H(vj, V (gi), Qgi) and H(v
j , V (gi), Qgi) > 0 , the profit of agent i is certainly above
zero and its probability of being selected is the highest when it bid its type . So X mechanism is
partly truthful .
THEOREM 4.3 In x mechanism , it is truthful for each group gi.
PROOF We assumed when agents of group gi changing their valuation ,the valuation of other
agents remain unchanged and all the original outcome(o1, o2, . . .) don’t change. Then the total
payment to group g′is P (gi) = v
gi +Qgi = v
gi + s((gi)+1) - s(g(i−1)+1) is unchanged because when
vgi increase some quantity , the Qgi will decrease the same quantity. In a word , P (gi) is unchanged
even when vgi increase in some condition , so it is truthful for each group gi.
Remark 4.3 In the Shortest Path problem , mechanism can increase its utility by decreasing its
payment or decrease its utility by increasing its payment.
Definition 4.3 A mechanism belongs to Critical mechanism if it satisfies the following three
conditions:
(1)It is partly truthful mechanism.
(2) If mechanism increase its utility a little, there are only one possible outcome;
(3)If mechanism decrease its utility a little, there are at lease two possible outcome.
THEOREM 4.4 Vickrey auction is critical.
Definition 4.4 A mechanism belongs to Strongly Critical mechanism if it satisfies the following
two conditions:
(1)It is Critical mechanism.
(2)The payment given to any group which been selected in the shortest path always is a critical
value. In other words, If the payment to any group which been selected in the shortest path
increase a little, then the mechanism can choose another path to substitute this shortest path by
this increased payment.
THEOREM 4.5 X mechanism is a Strongly Critical mechanism .
THEOREM 4.6 VCG mechanism is not a Critical mechanism .
In following definitions , we assume the number of the agents is n. The bid of agent is denoted
by vi , the utility of agent i is denoted by ui. (v1, v2, . . . , vi−1, vi+1
, . . . , vn) is denoted by v−i , and the possibility of agent i being chosen when its bidding is vi is
denoted by pr(vi).
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Definition 4.5 OBSi(A)={vi|vi can make ui maximum in some v−i at mechanism A}
In some v−i at mechanism A , the Optimal bidding set of agent i (OBSi(A)) is the set that
contains only every value of vi which possibly make ui maximum in this situation.
Definition 4.6 At mechanism A, the Optimal bidding set of all agent’s is denoted by OAB(A)={(
v1, v2, . . . , vn)|v1 ∈ OBS1, v2 ∈ OBS2, . . . , vn ∈ OBSn, }.
Definition 4.7 AES(A)={(v1, v2, . . . , vn)|(v1, v2, . . . , vn) can make the profit of mechanism A
maximum}
Definition 4.8 IOA(A)= OAB(A) ∩ AES(A) . The Intersection of OAB(A) and AES(A) is
denoted by IOA(A).
Definition 4.9 Mechanism A is Consistent if IOA(A) 6= ∅ in any situations.
Definition 4.10 Mechanism A is Strongly Consistent if IOA(A)=OAB(A) or IOA(A)= AES(A)
in any situations.
Definition 4.11 Mechanism A is Partially Consistent if IOA(A) = ∅ in some cases and
IOA(A) 6= ∅ in other cases.
Definition 4.12 Mechanism A is Impossible Consistent if IOA(A) = ∅ in any situations.
Suppose the agents and the mechanism tries to maximum the mathematical expectation of their
utility , we will give some examples of above definitions: X Mechanism is a Consistent mechanism
,the First Price Auction is an Impossible Consistent Mechanism, the Vichrey Auction is a Strongly
Consistent mechanism, the VCG mechanism is a Partially Consistent mechanism. Detailed analysis
as follows:
(1) The First Price Auction is an Impossible Consistent mechanism
In First Price Auction mechanism, the agent has two strategy of bidding , the first is bidding
his type ti, the second is decreasing his bidding to vi (0 < vi < ti) for gaining more profit
(ui = ti− vi) but at the same time his probability of be chosen decreases. In first strategy ,vi = ti
, ui(vi = ti) = ti − vi = 0, the expectation of his utility is ui × pr(ti) + 0 × (1 − pr(ti)) = 0
. In second strategy, 0 < vi < ti, ui(vi < ti) = ti − vi > 0 and the possibility of being chosen
0 < pr(vi) < pr(ti) , the expectation of his utility is ui(vi < ti)× pr(vi) + 0× (1− pr(vi)) > 0 .
According to expectation of utility , agent chooses the second strategy of bidding , then OBSi
(First Price Auction)={vi|0 < vi < ti}. So OAB(First Price Auction )={(v1, v2, . . . , vn)|0 < vi <
ti, 0 < v2 < t2, . . . , 0 < vn < tn}.
Obviously, the auctioneer’s utility is decided by the the highest bidding, so AES(First Price
Auction )={(v1, v2, . . . , vn)| the bidder of highest bidding bid his type}
IOA(First Price Auction)=OAB(First Price Auction )∩ AES(First Price Auction ) = ∅.
So, First Price Auction is an impossible Consistent mechanism.
(2) Vichrey Auction is a Strongly Consistent Mechanism.
Because Vichrey Auction is truthful , OAB(Vichrey Auction)={(t1, t2, . . . , tn)}. AES(Vichrey
Auction)= {(v1, v2, . . . , vn)| the bidder of second highest bidding bid his type},
IOA(Vichrey Auction)=OAB(Vichrey Auction)∩ AES(Vichrey Auction) ={(t1,
t2, . . . , tn)}= OAB(Vichrey Auction).
So Vichrey Auction is a Strongly Consistent Mechanism .
(3) VCG mechanism is a Partially Consistent Mechanism
Because VCG mechanism is truthful , OAB(VCG mechanism)={(t1, t2, . . . , tn)}.
To explain the computation of AES(VCG mechanism) , we take two example of Shortest Path
problem . In the following Graph , Suppose sender X is looking for a path to Y for transmiting
something. There are several paths from X to the Y. Each edge on the path stands for an selfish
agent. The number beside every agent stands for its type ti.
Figure 2
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Figure 3
Suppose the minimum unit of currency is 1 and no two paths have the same length. In graph
2,AES(VCG mechanism)={(va = 2, vb = 1, vc = 1, vd = 5), (va = 1, vb = 2, vc = 1, vd = 5), (va =
1, vb = 1, vc = 2, vd = 5)}, OAB(VCG mechanism)={
(va = ta = 1, vb = tb = 1, vc = tc = 1, vd = td = 5)} , So IOA(VCG mechanism)=OAB(VCG
mechanism)∩ AES(VCG mechanism)=∅
In graph 3, AES(VCG mechanism)={(ve = 1, vf = 5), (ve = 2, vf = 5), (ve = 3, vf = 5), (ve =
4, vf = 5)}, OAB(VCG mechanism)={(ve = 1, vf = 5)} , So IOA(VCG mechanism)=OAB(VCG
mechanism)∩ AES(VCG mechanism)= {(ve = 1, vf = 5)} 6= ∅.
Thus, VCG mechanism is a Partially Consistent mechanism.
(4) X Mechanism is Consistent mechanism
Considering X Mechanism in Shortest Path problem , when agent i bid its type(vi = ti) , the
possibility of its been selected is maximum, and its profit is bigger than 0; when the bidding of
agent i is more than its type(vi > ti), the possibility of its been selected is less than that of when
it bid its type , and its profit is bigger than that of when it bid its type .
For the risk-avert agents and the agents who don’t want to spend much of time in collecting
information of other agents’ bidding, they will choose bid their type, and their profit bigger than
0. In this situation , X mechanism can attain optimal results. For the agents who pursue high
profits even if the risk of the possibility of being not selected become higher , they choose to raise
their bidding which bigger than its type.
So OBSi(X Mechanism)={vi|vi ≥ ti}
OAB(X Mechanism)={(v1, v2, . . . , vn)|v1 ≥ t1, v2 ≥ t2, . . . , vn ≥ tn}
Suppose the maximum number of group in shortest path is k in X Mechanism, then the total
payment to the agents in shortest path is the sum of bidding of the agents in the (k+1)-th shortest
path. So AES(X Mechanism)={(v1, v2, . . . , vn)|the bidder of the (k+1)-th shortest path bid their
types}
IOA(X Mechanism)= OAB(X Mechanism)∩ AES(X Mechanism) ={(v1, v2, . . . ,
vn)| vj = tj for any bidder j in the (k+1)-th shortest path, and for any other agents i ,vi ≥ ti} 6= ∅
.
So X Mechanism is Consistent Mechanism.
5 Compare X mechanism and other mechanism
5.1 the total payment mechanism
If the agent is risk-avert , then every agent will report their type in X mechanism or VCG
mechanism . In X mechanism can output with lower total cost than VCG mechanism.
If there is only one node on the cheapest path , VCG mechanism and X mechanism are the
same with Vickery auction.
If the agent is not risk-averterhe may probably raise the price under our mechanism but he will
not raise price under VCG mechanism. In this case, each mechanism is possibly better than other
mechanism, according to the concrete situation of all agents’ raising price.
For example , in above example 1, if the agents in the sixth shortest path(N and O) raise
their bidding less than or equal to two times of their original bidding, then the total payment of
X mechanism is less than that of VCG mechanism ; if they raise their bidding more than two
times of their original bidding , then the total payment of X mechanism is more than that of VCG
mechanism .
5.2 truthful
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5.3 inherit and change
Vickery auction is the specific example of X mechanismin which Every class has only one
edge. Characteristics of truthful mechanism is the money given to the first selected bidders is less
than the second selected bidders when the first selected bidders all quit. The extend manner is
different. VCG extends Vickery auction by ways of considering agent’s profit and preserves truthful
characteristic; X mechanism extends Vickery auction by ways of considering mechanism’s profit
and remains the Balanced characteristic. And when every group has only one member k-Group
and VCG is the same.
So X mechanism and VCG mechanism both extend the Vickrey auction. Now we apply X mech-
anism to the Example 1,as follows: Shortest Path: XABCDY Second Shortest Path : XABGHY
In our mechanism, A and B are 3-group points. C and D are 1-group points. The profit of 1-group
points is Q1,Q1 = g2 - g1 = 12 - 6 = 6. The profit of 3-group points is Q3, Q3 = g4 - g3 = 25 -
14 = 11 . The pure profits of point A,B,C,D are PA,PB,PC,PD respectively. PA = wA + H( Q3
), PB = wB + H( Q3 ), PC = wC + H( Q1 ), PD = wD + H( Q1 ),
Truthful mechanism only consider optimizing the g(o, w) = vi(ti, o) , even if at the cost of
p(o, w) =
n∑
i=1
pi sometimes. X mechanism not only take account of optimizing the g(o, w), but also
take account of minimize p(o, w). It as possible as pays attention to both above object at the same
time. In the situation that can not attain the two above object at the same time, X mechanism
first considered minimizing p(o, w).
X mechanism is a compromise of the First Price Auction and the Vichery Auction.
In the First Price AuctionAn auction in which the agent who submitted the highest bidden is
awarded the object being sold and pays a price equal to the amount bid., the lower bidding price
it is, the bigger chance that the agent will choose it. When the chance of the agent be selected is
the biggest (bid his type), the profit it will get is zero.
In the Vichery Auction, auctioneer will give the second-highest price to the agent who submitted
the highest price. The payment to the agent which submitted the highest price is not related to
the price that he submitted. When the chance of the agent be selected is biggest (tell his type),
the profit it will get is biggest.
In X mechanism , it is truthful for each group in the shortest path. If agent in one group raises
his valuation his payment will increase. But the chance for him to be selected will decline. So
when the chance for the agent to be selected is biggest (bid his type), X mechanism can make sure
his profit is more than zero but not always the greatest as that of Vichery Auction (Except there
is only one agent in the shortest path). What is more, the total cost of X mechanism (p(W )) is
smaller than that in VCG mechanism under the conditions that the bid of all agent is unchanged.
There are an improvement to the First Price Auction. The payment to the agent who submitted
the highest price be the diffence of its bidding and a constant C .On the surface it works like X
mechanism, the profit of every agent is bigger than zero when its chance be seclected is biggest.
But in fact, in order to gain bigger chance, agents will adding C to his original bidding . So when
the chance of agents be seclected is biggest , (under the participation constraints ), the profit of
agents is zero .
5.4 computing complexity
The computing complexity of X mechanism is the same as that of the VCG mechanism.
In X mechanism , the computing is just as same as that in VCG mechanism. In VCG mech-
anism, pi = di=∞ − di=0, when compute di=∞, the new shortest path should be computing. If
i belong to k-group, then when vi=∞ , the new shortest path is the (k + 1)-shortest path. In X
mechanism, when computing the group of the agent i in the cheapest path, let vi=∞ and computing
the new shortest path . If i belong to k-group, then the new shortest path is (k+1)-shortest path.
Both of the two above mechanism need to calculate the shortest path and new shortest path when
each agent in the shortest path is removed.
Suppose the number of agents in the Shortest path is n and there are k groups in the Shortest
Path , there are only two things that not compute in VCG mechanism should be computed in X
mechanism : the one is to calculate the length cost of the (k + 1)-shortest path, the other is put
the edges that is removed will lead to the same Shortest Path in one group and sorting the length
of new Shortest Path which is formed when some edge is removed.
There are some algorithms in the shortest path problem which can lead to O(V +E) or O(V 2)
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time complexity [,, k-th shortest path,jacm] , where V is the number of the vertex, E is the number
of the edges.There are some algorithms in the sorting problem whose time complexity are m(lnm)
, therein m is the number of elements. So the time complexity of VCG is O(n ∗ (V +E)), and the
time complexity of X mechanism is O(n ∗ (V +E)+ (V +E)+n(ln(n)) = O(n ∗ (V +E)) (because
V > n) So the time complexity of X algorithmic is as the same as that of VCG mechanism.
6. Tradeoff of Truthful mechanism and X mechanism
We take VCG mechanism as an example to introduce truthful mechanism below. Through the
above discussion we know that for each group the X mechanism is truthful. But for each agent,
it’s partly truthful. Therefore, each agent will rise up the price in order to increase his profit. But
we know that the VCG mechanism is truthful. So we can combine the X mechanism with VCG
mechanism . For example, we list three possible form of combinatorial mechanism as follows:
6.1 Tradeoff mechanism 1
Definition 6.1.(combinatorial mechanism) A mechanism m = (o, p) belongs to combinatorial
mechanism if:
(1) C is given in advance, 0 =< C <= 1
(2) the outcome of VCG mechanism is termed as oI(w), and the outcome of X mechanism is
termed as oII(w).
(3) if (Payment(oI(w)) - Payment(oII(w)))/ Payment(oI(w)) > C, then the payment method
of X mechanism is adopted, otherwise the payment method of VCG mechanism is adopted.
Remark 6.1 . Payment(oI(w)) ≥ Payment (oII(w)). (Proved in above )
6.2 Tradeoff mechanism 2
every agent of the j -th group gain the same payment, which is (sj+1 − sj) .Obviously , this
is more truthful than the X mechanism and less than VCG. In fact , this mechanism is strongly
partly truthful.
With the bidding increasing , the profit will increasing non-linearly. Suppose the original
bidding of agent i is vi , and it is in group k.
When ∆vi ≤ sk+1 − sk,
P i = (sk+1 − sk) + v
i
= (sk+1 − (sk +∆vi)) + (vi +∆vi)
= (sk+1 − sk) + vi
if sk+1 − sk−1 ≥ ∆vi > sk+1 − sk,
P i = (sk+1 − sk−1) + vi
= (sk+1 − (sk−1 +∆vi)) + (vi +∆vi)
= (sk+1 − sk−1) + vi
sk+1 − sk−2 ≥ ∆vi > sk+1 − sk,
P i = (sk+1 − sk−2) + v
i
...
...
sk+1 − s1 ≥ ∆vi > sk+1 − s2,
P i = (sk+1 − s1) + vi
∆vi > sk+1 − s1,
P i = 0
6.3 Tradeoff mechanism 3 ( )
Combinatorial mechanism in nature is that it would rather pay more in a certain range to
motivate agents to tell their types truthfullyto increase the truthfulness of mechanism at the cost
of critical. It can make the X mechanism near to truthful.
Compare the four mechanisms:
1.X mechanism: All the agents of the the k-th group share the difference between the total
bidding of the (k + 1)-th group and that of the k-th group.
2. Tradeoff mechanism 2:Every agent of the the k-th group obtain the same profit respectively,
which is the difference between the total bidding of the (k+1)-th group and that of the k-th group.
3. Tradeoff mechanism 3:All the agents of the the k-th group share the difference between the
total bidding of the (k + 1)-th group and that of first group.
4.VCG mechanism: Every agent of the the k-th group obtain the same profit respectively, which
is the difference between the total bidding of the (k + 1)-th group and that of first group.
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Future works
In the Vichery Auction, the payment to the agent that bid the highest bidding (suppose this
agent is agent 1) is only related to the second highest bidding v2, so p1 = F (v2).
In the First Price Auction, the payment to the highest bidder 1 is only related to the the
bidding of itself. so p1 = F (v1).
We can combine the above two mechanism , let the payment to the highest agent 1 is p1 =
F (v1, v2), Such as p1 = (v1 + v2)/2 . Obviously, v1 > p1 > v2. In this mechanism, the higher
v1 is, the higher the p1 is. As a result, it is less truthful than the Vichery Auction. In fact, it is
partly truthful. The merit of this mechanism is that the utility of mechanism is bigger than that
of Vichery Auction.
Further, we can let the p1 = F (v1, v2, . . . , vn).
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